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By mapping the trajectories of changing dynamics in land relations in both colonial and postcolonial
periods in rural West Bengal, this chapter tries to understand the way the land has been determining the
issues of the rural economy in the rural hinterland. Based on field-survey data, this chapter argues, first,
that the issues of land are shaped through a complex process of dynamic interaction between class,
caste and capital. Second, the way the state and its policies do intervene in this complex process in
order to shape the issues of land in rural areas has been complicating the matter further by way of
privileging the capital and the landed class belonging to higher castes at the expense of the labouring
class belonging to subordinate caste groups.
This chapter aims to understand the question of land in rural West Bengal in terms of class and caste. As
in the Indian case, Damodaran correctly states, ‘economic behaviour is embedded in concrete social
relations’ (2008: 1), the analysis of land issues in context of caste might yield fruitful results so as to
understand the problem more insightfully. As capitalism develops, the scholar observes, ‘through a
number of business communities rather than an integrated business class’ (Ibid.: 2), the issues of land also
tend to revolve around more through the dynamics of caste rather than through the dynamics of class. By
mapping the trajectories of changing dynamics in land relations in both colonial and postcolonial periods,
this chapter explains the way the land has been determining the economy in rural hinterland. Upon
examining the field work data gathered in recent period, it reveals, first, that the issues of land are shaped
through a complex process of dynamic interaction between class, caste and capital. Second, the way the
state and its policies do intervene in this complex process in order to shape the issues of land in rural areas
has actually been complicating the matter further by privileging the capital and the landed class belonging
to higher castes at expense of the labouring class from subordinate castes. The first section of this chapter
explores, on the one hand, the trajectory of transformations in land relations and the role of the upper
caste landholding group in shaping the phenomenon of landlessness and, on the other, the implication of
policy intervention on the part of the government on all rural classes and groups, particularly on the
subordinate land-poor groups. The second section explains the dynamics of ascendancy of the rich
peasantry to power in rural West Bengal by means of land ownership and authority over labour, and its
politics within the state domain, and beyond, in shaping the condition of labour in the province. The third
section examines the way the subordinate labouring class in rural West Bengal do cope with the
predicament of their landlessness, and subsequently construct their politics in order to shape, on the one
hand, the dynamic consequences of landlessness and on the other, the state policies aiming at generating
employment. This chapter concludes that owing to the determinant role of capital whatsoever in
agriculture the state of rural economy of India, particularly of West Bengal, has deteriorated leading to
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1.  Land, Landed Class and Caste
In its attempt to carry on ‘the extraction of a part of the surplus in the form of land revenue’ (Chatterjee
1984: 6), the colonial government had undertaken several try-outs in vain before permanently being
settled with the Permanent Settlement. Tellingly, the enactment of Permanent Settlement seemed to be the
first attempt to make a decree in the ‘vast network of laws’, as the scholars argue, ‘created to legally
enshrine specific rights to various groups across the country’ (Nielsen and Oskarsson 2016: 69). Most
historical narratives written about the experiences of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal reveal more or
less the same story that the economy of the province ceased to prosper anymore, rather decaying every
now and then, despite the repeated attempts of reviewing the situation and the subsequent policy
intervention, be it new or revised form, by the colonial government. Diverse kinds of interests articulated
by several numbers of classes, sections and groups thus came to the fore with their own ambiguous rights,
identities and demands as consequences of, particularly, the intervention of the organized domain of
politics therein. In contrast to the interests of the British colonial state which was imagined as the
‘sovereign authority’ of all revenues, three categories of main classes made their appearance with their
overlapping—sometimes conflictual, sometimes cooperative—demands and interests in the ‘political
drama’ performed in colonial Bengal during the last three decades.
First, the class at the top of the agrarian structure was of the zamindars, the proprietors of the soil. The
folks mainly from the upper castes constituted this category by utilizing the opportunities opened by the
Permanent Settlement. Apart from the old established landholding families, many others from among the
upper castes took the opportunities to become either the ‘collectors of revenues’ or the privileged
‘farmers’, and later in due course transformed into a zamindar class. Sarkar (2016) rightly argues that
even the businessmen who were once prosperous had become zamindars afterwards. The affluent section
of professionals who made their fortunes by way of practicing law and medicines had invested their
surplus money either to buy the company’s newspapers or the ‘zamindari’ (Sarkar 2016). He attributes
this trend to the lack of interest on the part of Bengali people in business. Sarkar seemed to fail to observe
two important reasons why the Bengali people tempted to buy the zamindari. The affluent Bengali
persons were tempted to buy the zamindari because, on the one hand, the zamindari was very lucrative,
that is, prosperous at that time and, on the other, the business and trades were then progressively turned
into loss-making sectors due to the invasion of British imperialist capital. However, Sarkar’s narrative
depicts one trend clearly that many people, mostly the upper castes,  who were already settled in other
sectors had conveniently become the zamindars owing to the facilitating arrangement provided by the
Permanent Settlement. But their days were not stable and began to evaporate since particularly the
beginning of the twentieth century. Now this upper caste landholding class made a venture towards cities
and urban areas to grab all new opportunities in the bureaucracy and trade after the scope of rentier
economy began to vanish. This category began to face a two-pronged challenge, on the one hand, from
the mass of peasantry and, on the other, from a new class of rich peasant-moneylender-traders. Do we
read it on caste term and say that the upper castes began to face challenges both from the lower castes and
the middle castes as far as land is concerned?
Second, by utilizing the growing land market, commercial farming and farm-related trading, and, of
course, the scope of expansion of agriculture in newer stretches of lands, a new class of people had
emerged during the period of late colonialism. This new class can be called as the ‘rich peasant-
moneylender-trader’ class. The people of this class had in the main come from the middle and lower
castes as indicated in the studies by Chatterjee (1984, 1987), Sanyal (1981) and others and became
prosperous gradually through cultivating new land either by purchasing from the debt-trapped peasantry
and from the decaying zamindar class who already began to leave the soil of rural Bengal. Considering
the case of West Bengal, the castes like Sadgope, Mahishya, Ugrakshatriya among the middle castes and
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Poundra Kshatriya and Rajbanshi among the scheduled castes (SCs) would constitute this new class. We
would also find that a considerable section of Muslim peasants falls in this class inhabited mainly in
Bangladesh and in some parts of the northern region of West Bengal. The history of emergence of this
class is thus not so old. Hence, the way the castes belonging to this class could shape their trajectory of
development in both economic and political terms is very significant to understand the economy and
politics of rural West Bengal. The narrative of this class seems also to be important since it has established
its ‘control over the land and the produce of the peasantry’ by ‘challenging the erstwhile dominance of the
landed proprietor’ (Chatterjee 1984: 62).
The third category is the mass of peasantry in rural West Bengal. The people of this category were the
worst victims of the breakdown of small peasant economy in Bengal during the period of late colonialism.
The peasantry at large who were once mostly the rent payee raiyats turned into marginal in terms of their
dismal economic condition. Due to the stress exerted both from the upper caste proprietors and the
colonial state, many of them were forced to lose their land and subsequently had become poor peasants.
They were turned into either the sharecroppers by losing ownership rights or agricultural labours by
losing even the occupancy rights to land. The category of marginal peasants includes the poor peasants,
the sharecroppers  and the raiyats (also under-raiyats). A fierce conflict between the upper caste
proprietors and the mass of peasantry actually had torn the eastern part of undivided Bengal apart. The
lower castes including the middle castes and the scheduled castes as well as the scheduled tribes (STs)
had constituted this category for which most of the government policies are aimed at.
If we take stock of the current status of these classes/castes, we will find an interesting trajectory of
class/caste dynamics at the grassroots of Bengal. My ethnographic research (Roy 2013) reveals that most
of the local zamindars belonging to the upper castes have eventually fled from their ancestral villages
owing to the resistance of the peasantry belonging mainly to the SC and ST and also in some occasions
to the middle-caste Mahishya under the leadership of Communist Left during the period of 1960s and
1970s (Ibid.). The upper-caste families (here the Kayasthas) have either sold off their land or still have
kept it in their possession. In the latter case, they are to engage the sharecroppers for cultivating their land.
Most of them have actually taken modern professions and so settled in cities like Kolkata. In my recent
survey conducted in 18 villages in 18 districts of West Bengal, I found another interesting phenomenon.
Among these 18 villages that had been randomly selected, there is no noticeable trace of the upper castes
in as more as 12 villages. This phenomenon is attributable to the proactive roles of the Left Front
government and its constitutive parties, to be precise, of the upper castes in implementing and, to some
extent, improvising the land reform policies in rural West Bengal. In so doing, the upper castes who had
once been the proprietors of land and the perpetrators of rural distress attempted to cut down to size the
power of their erstwhile rival, the class of rich peasant-moneylender-traders and thereby establishing their
base among the poor peasantry. Do their roles, in that case, indicate any antagonism between two
dominant classes, as suggested by the theorists of passive revolution? I mean to say, is this a class
contradiction between two classes, that is, the landed elites or rich peasantry, on the one hand, and the
bureaucracy, that is, the upper castes, on the other?
Whether or not this effort of the Left Front is a manifestation of perpetual class antagonism between two
dominant classes is actually not a factor here to influence the role of the upper castes in policy making on
land front. Being the communist (Marxist), the members of these parties could never cross beyond their
class boundary and so have hardly left any imprints, in good sense, in rural areas to turn the situation
upside down. What these upper castes have done is actually the same as their counterparts in other states
intended to do. This is to mean a closer look would easily reveal what the erstwhile proprietors of land
have scripted are nothing but the end-products of their caste-class ideologies. The land reform
programmes are not meant for the absolute benefit of landless peasants in long term, instead, are devised
keeping in mind the case of the labouring class. This means the issues of landlessness are not here
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prioritized. Instead, it seems that the aim of the land reform policies is to at best reduce the rate of
poverty. The causes of rural unemployment are reasoned from the standpoint of the upper echelon of the
society in class and caste terms, so are the measures of employment generation.
2.  Land, Peasantry and the Dominant Caste
Notwithstanding the fact  that there are various sets of data regarding the evolution of landholding
structures in West Bengal, the data about caste-specific landholding structure are really fewer. I would
divide the peasantry purposefully into two categories, the rich peasantry and the poor peasantry. Ignoring
the consistent debates and confusions regarding different contradictory sets of data, I would reiterate
advantageously the conventional supposition that the rich peasantry in general do represent the lower or
middle castes particularly in south-western part of Bengal and, partially, two scheduled castes Poundra
kshatriya and Rajbanshi in southern part and the northern part of West Bengal respectively.  Needless to
say, the poor peasantry would represent the scheduled caste and the scheduled tribe. Long before the
penetration of organized state politics, two numerically significant middle castes in southern West Bengal,
presently called as Sadgope and Mahishya,  had chosen their route of social mobility in the middle of
sixteenth century. Sanyal’s magisterial study (1981) has revealed that these castes had first broken away
from their parent body known as Gope (a pastoral group) and Chasi Kaibartas (a fishing community)
respectively and shifted steadily to agriculture as their new profession. Both the dissident groups,
particularly the Sadgope, ‘spread over the territory extending between the left bank of Bhagirathi river
and the south-western fringe of Bengal, became settled agriculturalist, traders, and officials of the state
and of the zamindars’ (Ibid.: 45).
Within a short period of time, they had become prosperous cultivators and also substantial landowners and
subsequently established themselves as a political power in a vast region. The amalgamation of economic
power in terms of land occupation and ownership, and political power helped these castes to achieve
cultural superiority by means of ‘instituting social services like temple building and offering lucrative
grants, such as rent-free land, to the Brahmans’. Subsequently, these factors altogether made Sadgopes
and Mahishyas recognized as Nabasakh  castes. Since then, these two castes have been enjoying cultural
superiority and posing as dominant castes until recently in the vast tracts of southern West Bengal. Recent
ethnographies by the present author on the two castes show the way the Sadgope and the Mahishya do
endeavour to continue their domination, cultural, economic and political, in everyday lives of the rural
people. The relationship between the dominant castes and the subordinate castes (the Sis) in that region
has not only been hierarchical but also a source of severe discrimination in regard to various socio-
economic aspects. The hierarchy or discrimination is such that the people of these dominant middle castes
are often called as bhadralok and that of the subordinate castes are considered as chhotoloks.
The economy of this category of rich peasant-moneylenders-traders though been risen steeply in the first
half of postcolonial period began to collapse gradually in the recent period. The green revolution
technology had brought advantage to this category in the preliminary period, but tended to disadvantage
them mainly due to the government’s apathy to the distress call of the peasantry. While the peasantry have
consistently been distressed due to the determinant role of the unfavourable market, the government
instead of protecting them by way of reducing the onslaught of the ‘elite’ commercial and capitalist
classes did aid the latter in their venture of profit accumulation. Victimized both in the field of production
and in the field of marketing, the peasantry at large, particularly, the rich peasantry, rarely does embrace
a solvent position so that they could pose a challenge to the dominance of the upper castes. Notably, a
small group of rich farmers who are having a substantial proportion of land could make their fortune even
until the recent period through exploiting the scope of profit making by means of hoarding crops coupled
with farming.  However, the rural dominant categories though being in the forefront to manage the
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subordinate in terms of decision making. The rich peasantry has, therefore, been unable to be a part of the
coalition of dominant classes, as the theorists of passive revolution argue, as far as the politics of West
Bengal is concerned. Rather, as the situation of the state betrays, the upper castes/classes or the
bureaucracy, allied with the capitalist classes, have been dominating the politics of West Bengal often at
the expense of interests of the peasantry at large. The rich peasantry  or ‘the dominant castes’ have hardly
any role in formulation of the policies and acts aimed at all rural classes, including their own class.
The main reason behind this phenomenon seems to be, I argue, the rich peasants’ lack in economic and
political power even in the field of political institutions and legislatures in the state. Unlike their
counterparts in other states, they could not even decide the policies that affect their own issues within and
outside the parties and mass organizations since as the leadership of those parties and mass organizations
were captured by the upper strata. The political representation of ‘agriculturists’, the rich peasants in
context of West Bengal, however, in Pariliament had increased consistenly during the period of 1952-
1967 while the proportion in the Parliament of the professionals, particularly, the lawyers who were more
active in the party during the pre-independence India was in decline. The proportion of the ‘agriculturists’
in Parliament had increased from 18.3 per cent in 1952 to 36.8 per cent in 1967. If we count it in all party
terms, we would see that the proportion has increased from 22.4 per cent in 1952 to 31.1 per cent in 1967.
The proportion of agriculturists, in fact, in the Parliament has increased progressively throughout the
years. The proportion of the same class in Parliament reached its highest, that is to say, 49.06 per cent in
the 12th Parliamentary elections, whereas it is 39 per cent in the last elections (2014) (16th) (Parliament
of India website).  The increasing proportion of the agriculturalists or the ‘large landlords’ in Parliament
might indicate the fact that the political power of the said class has increased substantially to influence at
least numerically the policies and acts meant for rural and agricultural issues. Chatterjee rightly states that
the legislature of the states like Punjab and Haryana has, therefore, been witnessing the fiery debates ‘on
land ceilings or the procurement price of food grains’ (1999: 53).
However, the question is whether West Bengal has witnessed any such stormy debate on the issues
mentioned above at the political arena, be it the legislature or the political parties. Presumably, the state
has barely witnessed such kind of fierce debates in the legislature and in the political parties that initiated
on the part of the representatives of rich peasants. Indeed, the list of the MPs elected in West Bengal,
whatever their party identities may be, clearly reveals that not even a single MP in West Bengal belongs to
the rich peasantry at least as far as their profession is concerned. It might be the case that at least a few of
the MPs though have been elected from seats of the rural region and belonging to the rich peasantry class
have preferred to mention business or social work as their profession to farming whatever the reasons may
be. In no case, however, the representation of the rich peasants in the political arena doesn’t count much,
so does the issue of rich peasants. During my field work in the state, I found that the rich peasants,
especially, in the Hooghly district instantly vented their grievances against the governments for its failure
to aid them in their acute distress. One rich farmer asserts, ‘we don’t have our own party or platform on
behalf of which we can negotiate our issues or requirements with the government. In other states, the
farmers are organized and so do succeed to garner the benefit in a united way in regard to farming. For
instance, the farmers of the other states have largely benefited by way of subsidization in tariff for electric
pumps’.  It is easily discernible at this stage how far the rich farmers could get capacity to influence the
governmental policies, especially the policies aimed at land issues in rural areas, while they themselves
are in want of scope to place their own demands on the government.
The rich peasants are, however, not in need of scope to exert their influence in shaping the nature of
outcomes of the governmental policies when the latter are moving downwards for implementation to the
rural grassroots. The classes that are dominant in the rural West Bengal do then become the custodians of
governmental policies and make every effort to determine its fate, of course in collaborating with the
upper castes-classes who are living in the cities. The top political leaders as well as the bureaucracy most
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of whom belonging to the upper castes–class are seemingly agreed at least to some extent to compromise
on some issues proposed by the rural dominant class. Presumably, due to this very reason, the Left Front
leaders, as we have seen, who were very active in formulating the MGNREGA at the Centre had visibly
been reluctant at the initial period to implement this act in the state in 2006. The rural leaders of both of
the party and the panchayat especially those belonging to the landowning higher castes do usually
interpret their tasks of implementing the act in terms of supplicant modality, particularly if and when the
benefit seekers do belong to the landless subordinate groups and the vice versa. As hordes of uncertainty
prevailed in every step of implementation of the programme ranging from creating of work to payment of
wages, the beneficiaries are seen to be immensely dependent on the leaders of the respective fields and so
eventually become supplicant for even small things to be done. However, castes seem to provide more
signifying terms than class through which the social relations and the subsequent supplicant modality are
perceived.
3.  Landlessness, Employment and the Subordinate Castes
It has been described the way the category of peasants most of whom belonging to the lower castes
particularly the scheduled castes  in West Bengal have become increasingly poor and so be the target of
various governmental policies ever since even the colonial period. The poor peasantry, that is, the
landless peasants, the sharecroppers and the marginal land owners, could hardly improve considerably
their position throughout these years. Many people from this category seem to still remain unemployed or
underemployed during most part of the year all over the state. If we try to gauge the extent of their
predicament in terms of poverty discourse, it may appear that their economic condition has improved.
But, the ethnographic enquiry into their joblessness would soon make us disillusioned, and we would find
that a particular section of people in every village is consistently in search of work. This is the section
which constitutes the poor peasantry in West Bengal. This is the section which neither flourishes in
economic terms, nor ‘advances’ in social position. This is the section in the rural areas which identifies
that the land and land relations are the basis of all their problems in regard to work. History shows the
way in which this section of peasantry would mobilize itself in the late colonial period under the banner
of political parties taking the issues of land. However, it has also elucidated that the penetration of the
state in matter of land and land relations has only complicated the issues by rendering a section of
peasantry increasingly vulnerable by way of making them either landless or sharecropper.
From the Permanent Settlement to assorted kinds of Land Reform Act passed in postcolonial India
including the recent tenancy reforms initiated by the West Bengal government during the end of 1970s, as
my recent work shows (Roy 2018), the predicament of the people of this group has essentially hardly
changed. The people of this section who are enormously variegated in terms of proprietary and occupancy
rights in question of land have administratively been identified since long as various names, for example,
the raiyats, under-raiyats, tenants, sharecroppers, bargadars and so on, while the forms of precarity that are
associated with their livelihoods have remained the same. A longitudinal survey of the policies might
reveal that most of the policies and the acts in rural areas are meant for the benefit of this section of
people. This is the reason why this section of the people is the most politicized population in India. Why
does the politics of the state fail to deliver justice to this section of people notwithstanding its consistent
efforts by way of its policy intervention into the latter? The belief that the state is neutral and supposed to
be maintaining a balance among various classes and categories that existed at a particular point of time
seems to have been a real culprit in making our understanding blurred. How does the state take a neutral
position and maintain a balance among various classes in the societies which have already been skewed
towards the propertied classes? Does not the state require having a labouring class skew in order to
establish some forms of equality?
It is, of course, undeniable that the characters of the classes which constitute the power have great roles in
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determining and shaping the nature of policies and its implementation at the grassroots. However, I would
argue, what is more significant is the guiding ideology which does prompt the ruling classes to construct
their respective policies. The ideology decides the fate of capital and its accumulation in a particular
society. Take the land reform acts and policies, for instance, to understand its impacts on the landless
peasants of West Bengal in employment terms. During the period of colonialism, the Permanent
Settlement which was marked as the beginning of colonial policy regime in regard to land was just the
sheer reflection of the British capitalist interest to extract the profit from land in terms of revenues. The
subsequent land policies or acts, for instance, the Bengal Tenancy Act, which have been followed since
were of no exception. It may appear that those policies were having a marginal peasant category skew.
But a thorough historical analysis would prove that these were aimed at only to maintain the small peasant
economy for its uninterrupted exploitation in Bengal in longer term. All these policies, however, were
doomed to failure due mainly to the growing class contradiction in society and eventually culminated in
the recommendation of Floud Commission. The land reform acts that were undertaken in postcolonial
India are nothing but a reproduction of the Floud Commission which recommends, on the one hand, the
withdrawal of intermediaries and the direct relation between the state and tenants and on the other hand,
the landlords’ keeping hold of land though to a certain amount and the grant of compensation whatsoever
for departure from the zamindari. The first part of the recommendation is nothing new but the imitation of
indigenous tradition under which the peasants of Bengal had remained for long. The second part of the
recommendation is definitely drafted with an aim to benefit the landlord class. But, needless to say, it was
meant mainly for the enhancement of capital.
Whatever it may be, I have attempted to explain the impact of implementation of the land reform acts on
the peasants of two different settings of West Bengal which are distinct from each other not only in terms
of its geography and proximity to city, but also of its ethnographic components. The northern part and the
southern part of West Bengal are these two distinct regions. The landless peasants belonging to the ST
community who were at the forefront of the land struggles led by the Communists in the northern part
could hardly manage to get any land vested and distributed by the party. There exists a sense of latent
discontent among the landless labourers as most of the land that were seized from the jotedars families
had been distributed among the ardent followers of the top party leaders.  On the contrary, the erstwhile
jotedars families could retain most part of their lands and still own around 100 bighas of land as informed
by the present member of the panchayat. Most of them are to supplement their income from agriculture,
be it as cultivator or as day labourer. The villagers get lots of scope to involve themselves in various odd
jobs owing to the village’s proximity to the city. Agriculture is not considered usually gainful by most of
the landowners due to the very fact that most of the lands are not multi-crop and well-irrigated. The green
revolution technology seems to have not been useful in this particular area. Rather, as informed, land
inside the village has often been traded with the outsiders at soaring price, thanks to the rapid
urbanization. It transpires the fact that the land is not as useful in terms of agriculture as it is in terms of
trade. Therefore, despite the concentration of land in few hands, agriculture did not grow with reference
to productivity of land, and the capitalist expansion in agriculture too is somewhat moderate. The surplus
from land has not been accumulated in such a way that the class configuration would change. The
employment or livelihoods of most of the families irrespective of class and communities are not fully
based on the village economy with scores of people among them increasingly fleeing the village for
making both ends meet.
The out-migration of the people from the villages in the southern part of the state, however, as mentioned
earlier, is no less important to understand the recent crisis in work in rural areas. But the issues of land and
agriculture in this region seem to transpire a different story. The SC and ST families constitute, not
surprisingly, the category of landless. Interestingly, analysed separately, the SC families do hardly have
land due only to the reason that they didn’t obtain almost any patta land from the then party in power. On
the contrary, some ST families being the passionate loyal to the erstwhile ruling party could manage to
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obtain 0.25 bigha of land each on an average. The empirical findings transpire the fact that the village
economy which is characterized by farm-based work and agriculture has been viable by way of providing
employment for almost all villagers as main source of income. Non-farm works whatsoever are being
created at the margin even if sporadically have also been sustained by the activities associated with
farming. The landowners, particularly the substantial landowners, seem to have been prospering the most
by diversifying their professions into a number of other fields based mainly on sustainable agriculture
thanks to private irrigation initiatives.  Besides, these farmers do also enjoy the advantage of investing
the incomes from other occupations, be it the business and the service, in farming only in order to make it
more profitable. The class relations in terms of land and other occupations are sharply reflected in the
village reality.
Interestingly, the agricultural wages prevalent in both two sets of villages are lower to a great extent than
the wages stipulated by the government.  The question arises that in what way the rural labourers would
experience the indirect outcomes from the MGNREGA when they are not even drawing the minimum
wages prescribed by the government. What has been possible, as Carswell and Neve (2014) observed, in
Tiruppur district of Tamil Nadu that the rural poor could experience some real gains of MGNREGA is
actually still a dream to the rural labourers of West Bengal. Unlike their counterparts in Tamil Nadu, the
labourers in West Bengal do hardly experience ‘indirect outcomes include the availability of an
employment alternative, the increase in agricultural wages’ and ‘the improvements in labourers’
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers’ (Ibid.: 583). This is due to not only the fact that the programmes
under the MGNREGA are not effective in terms of both creation of work and regular payment of wages,
but also the very reason that the work under this act do not create a pressure on the supply chain of labour-
pool as mentioned earlier. Now let’s examine the outcomes of implementation of the provisions to benefit
directly the marginal peasants, that is, the sharecroppers as well as the so-called deprived sections like the
SC and ST people in terms of creating durable assets in the context of caste and class. It is often thought
that the revisions of the MGNREGA by way of notifications issued by the government are skewed
towards the interests of the labouring class and of the deprived social categories. It has no doubt, however,
that the likelihood of implementation of the provisions which are thought to be skewed towards the
interests of the labouring class and of the deprived social categories is often curtailed in the villages
wherein the dominant castes and the substantial landowners are in the helm of local power. As far as the
prevailing caste-class dynamics in West Bengal is concerned, it seems to be not an easygoing task that the
party and panchayat leaders, the land owners belonging to the higher castes, would follow the order of the
governments and implement immediately.
The class seems also to be a factor in carrying out the provisions meant for a definite class. Would the
people of the landholding class who require the agricultural labourers to cultivate their lands pay attention
to implement the provisions that would benefit their labourers? The findings reveal that despite the fact
that the landholding class and the landless class, the would-be beneficiaries, belong to the same SC
categories, these provisions have hardly been followed. In the south-western districts, a renowned NGO
has been devising projects of creating water harvesters on the lands of the SC and ST people mainly for
the purpose of irrigation. These water harvesters, locally called as Hapa, are obviously beneficial and ‘can
bring substantial changes’ to the livelihoods of the hapa-owners (Banerjee 2012: 11).  The acute scarcity
of water for irrigation debars even the landowners to make a decent livelihood in these districts. By
providing the irrigation water for agriculture, these water harvesters no doubt are changing the lives of the
landowners. Various cost-benefit analyses show the way their entrepreneurship has increased and they are
cultivating various crops ‘with an eye to the market’. Whether or not these water harvesters have changed
their lives once for all, however, would remain as a question for the future. The question which probably
concerns us more is about whether the lives of the landless labourers are also changing accordingly after
the construction of these water harvesters? The answers are, I suppose, mostly negative. Initially, the
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MGNREGA, but the creation of jobs didn’t continue for long. After a while, they would remain again
unemployed as usual. One budding phenomenon has rather increasingly been prominent at the grassroots
that the small and marginal cultivators who have in their possession the newly made water harvesters are
accumulating profits accrued from the land by way of high yielding of land, multi-crop cultivation and,
above all, multi-uses of water from the harvesters. They even try to make profit by selling irrigation water
to other owner cultivators, be it the sharecroppers or the landowners. Has there been a contrast class
relation emerging at the margin among the marginal peasants most of whom are belonging to the same
community? The classes are going to be distinct, but it remains to be seen how sharp they are.
The issues of land and work in rural areas are thus intensely rooted in the dynamic relations of castes and
classes. We must have to analyse the intricate relations among various castes and classes, if we endeavour
to understand the problem of poverty and unemployment in India. The capitalist transformations at the
rural hinterland since the early time under the British colonial rule have, of course, problematized the
domain of land and work in India to a great extent. The roles of the state, both the colonial and the
postcolonial, in shaping the nature of the issues associated with land are also of immense importance. By
exploring the nature of capitalist transformation in the domain of land and work at the rural hinterland of
West Bengal through a comparative analysis of different zones which are distinct from each other in terms
of not only its proximity to city but also its ethnographic components, this chapter reveals that the nature
of land relations and work varies greatly on the basis of specificities of a particular social reality. The rural
India has changed enormously since the liberalization of its economy in late 1980s, and the dynamic
condition of work including its security has subsequently taken new forms all over the country. Rural
West Bengal is no exception. While the ‘determinant’ role of capital whatsoever leads to transform the
class configuration and the economy in rural areas by means of marketization of farming and other
occupations, the government’s attempts aimed at supporting the rural labour through particularly the
MGNREGA do complicate the issue further. The question that arises is the way in which the
contemporary rural is changing as a result of marketization and, similarly, in what way do the politics of
rural people shape the outcomes of capitalist transformation. How do the rural people across class, caste,
religion and gender shape the economic restructuring of global capital in their lives and livelihoods? By
examining these questions critically, this chapter reveals that while the economic transformations do
impact differently on different classes of people in terms of land and work, a specific local setting having
particular forms of inequalities engender distinct capitalist dynamics.
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 The list of zamindars provided by Sarkar entails that many of them actually belonged to the upper castes.
 The sharecroppers include the bhagchasi, bargadar or adhiar.
 In both the cases, a proportion though being very small from Poundra Kshatrya and Rajbanshi is having large amount of landed
property and locally dominant. The social, political and economic dominance of this section of people are huge.
 Two other castes, namely Tili and Bhumij-Kshatriyas, had taken successfully the same way of social mobility movements.
 The Nabasakh rank in the caste hierarchy in Bengal is said to have been formed of nine (nava) branches (sakha) of the clean
sudras. But its rank now includes 14 castes, in some places in Bengal even 15 or 16 castes. In general social estimation, the
nabasakh castes remain below the Baidyas and Kayasthas as the latter are mostly land owners and professionals, while the
Nabasakh castes are traditionally and predominantly artisans, agriculturalists and traders. But like these two castes, they enjoy the
right to offer drinking water to the Brahmans. Hence they are jalacharaniya, that is, water (jal) served by them is acceptable to the
Brahmans. The nabasakh castes are entitled to receive the services of the clean Brahmans in their religious functions. (Sanyal
1981: 39–41).
 It is true, as Chatterjee argues, ‘whatever growth did occur was for a limited period, in specific regions and among owners of
large holding’ (1999: 53).
 Downloadable at www.parliamentofindia.nic.in/jpi/March2000/CHAP-5htm
 In 1999, the NSSO report says, only 12 per cent of all pump sets used by the farmers in West Bengal are electrified.
 This category includes most obviously the ST and the lower castes among the Muslims. As they are beyond our purview of
discussion, I would skip their cause.
 One respondent informs that the ardent followers of the top leaders of the CPI (M) party live in the neighbouring villages.
 Boro paddy and potato are grown extensively by the farmers as commercial crops. The Shallow Tube Well (STW)s and Deep
Tube Well (DTW)s are used for irrigation purpose if or when necessary.
 The men labourers earn around Rs. 150.00 with some food as breakfast in the morning as per day wages whereas the wage
stipulated by the state government of West Bengal was Rs. 206 with food per day during the same period.
 This is an ‘Impact study of Hapa and its multiple uses in Bankura district’. The study has been conducted in Hirbandh block,
Bankura, in the year 2012. The report of the study is downloadable at www.iwmi.cgir.org. Delhi.
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